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and Information Sciences 
This paper is a critique of the prevalent conceptual methodologies in research 
in library administration. It examines the current research methodologies 
found mostly in Dissertation Abstracts International (University Microfilms 
International) , relates them to the positivistic orientation of some social scien-
tists, indicates why they are inappropriate, and suggests how res~arch in li-
brary administration can be made more meaningful and relevant. 
A SEMINAL EVENT took place in May 1968 and speculation is reduced to a minimum. 
when sociology students at the University of How, then, do we arrive at proven knowl-
Nantes, France, violently demonstrated edge? A school of thought, generally identi-
against the government of their country. The fied by the name "positivism," contends that 
students presented the French government nothing that is not practically demonstrable 
with a document entitled, "Why Sociolo- can be regarded as truth. As Richard Sonnet 
gists?" in which they demanded radical aptly expressed it, "To touch, to measure, 
changes in sociology studies in France. 1 The and then to talk about the meaning of what 
focus of the protest was the type of sociology one had touched: This process was the guid-
taught in French universities: the students ing principle of positivism. "2 
viewed it as patently oriented to the defense Positivism insists that the methods of the 
of the status quo. natural sciences are appropriate in the study 
This protest was not new except that it of social phenomena. Why? Because the pur-
took a different pattern from earlier ones. suit of truth and the discovery of reality both 
Also, it was for a slightly different reason. demand that the investigator hold his per-
The development of approaches to the study sonal feelings, biases, preconceptions, and 
of social phenomena has, since antiquity, the like, in abeyance; they must never be al-
deeply troubled many critical minds. Since lowed to interfere with the discovery of real-
the period of the Greek scholars, members of ity. Even his sympathetic disposition toward 
the academic community have insisted on the human condition must not be permitted 
truth and honesty in all matters of scholar- to interfere with empirical evidence. Alfred 
ship. They have insisted that knowledge Schultz put it this way: "While the theorist 
must mean "proven knowledge"; proven ei- may be passionately interested in the fate and 
ther by practical, empirical demonstration quality of social and political life, he must 
or by the logic of reason. It was felt that bracket this practical interest in his pursuit of 
scholars have a responsibility to ensure that, theory. "3 It is this insistence that the methods 
even in thought, the gap between knowledge of the natural sciences are applicable to the 
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study of social phenomena that Richard Son-
nett calls "human empiricism. "4 
But "human empiricism" has not been left 
unchallenged. This challenge was spear-
headed by German and Italian students of 
society. The German historian Wilhelm 
Dilthey observed that we notice, touch, and 
measure only those things we already have 
the conviction are real; and the great Italian 
philosopher Beneditto Groce was puzzled by 
the insistence of empiricists that a science of 
man start with an inhuman premise, 
namely, that the scientist could set aside his 
or her own beliefs, feelings, and sense of real-
ity.5 
Other aspects of the challenge have been 
added in recent years. For instance, the 
American social theorist J. 0. House con-
tends that positivism is grossly inapplicable 
to the study of human society on at least two 
grounds. In the first place, the investigator 
himself is part of the subject matter that he is 
investigating and cannot, therefore, be ob-
jective and value free in the way that a natu-
ral scientist is presumed to be. Secondly, man 
is a different kind of phenomenon from the 
rest of nature in that his behavior is mediated 
by subjectively ascribed meanings that can-
not be observed by the investigator. 6 
William McBride even goes so far as to ar-
gue that "the whole idea of social science, 
given the meanings of the word science in 
contemporary English, is a mistake. "7 This 
may be something of an overstatement, but it 
has relevance in the context of current ap-
proaches to social science research. The 
whole notion of social science as a "science of 
society" leads, in the opinion of this writer, to 
unacceptable methodological trends in the 
study of human activities. 
PuRPOSE OF RESEARCH 
Let us go back to the fundamental ques-
tion: What is the purpose of research? It 
seems to me that, briefly stated, the sole pur-
pose of research is the development of theory. 
But what is theory? The French philosopher 
Francois Marie Arouet, known to history as 
Voltaire, once told his listeners, "If you wish 
to converse with me, define your terms. "8 
We would thus define theory here as an in-
ternally connected and logically consistent 
proposition about relationship(s) between 
phenomena. In essentially all circumstances, 
a theory is an explanation of an observed re-
lationship between phenomena. A theory al-
ways seeks to account for an observed event 
given specified circumstances. 
A theory is different from law, which 
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House defines as "an empirical generaliza-
tion that is held to be INVARIANT given 
specified conditions."9 Both theory and law 
are explanations of observed events; but, un-
like law, a theory is never held to be invari-
ant, however stringent its specified condi-
tions. A theory can easily be falsified by a 
new discovery or by a reinterpretation of its 
crucial propositions. 10 One is easily re-
minded of various theories that at one time 
provided plausible explanations of various 
phenomena in nature but were later super-
seded as more sophisticated and reliable in-
struments and techniquebwere discovered or 
invented. For illustrative purposes, let us 
confine ourselves to one area: library and in-
formation science research. 
EMERGING TRENDS IN LIBRARY 
AND INFORMATION SCIENCE 
A disturbing trend pervades library and 
information science and, in fact, most studies 
in the social sciences today. This trend is 
quantification of human behavior. This 
quantification arises from the mistaken be-
lief that reality can only be discovered 
through hard data; worse still is the prevail-
ing tendency to assume that mathematical or 
s a IS 1c va ues exp am rea 1 y and that so-
~ nescan e enve from them. Space 
does not permit a comprehensive survey of 
the whole spectrum of library and informa-
tion science research nor will such a compre-
hensive survey serve the intended purpose of 
this paper. We will, therefore, concentrate 
on one area of library and information sci-
ence research: library administration. 
A careful look at Dissertation Abstracts In-
ternational published during the last ten 
years on library administration reveals three 
areas of concentration. These three areas cor-
respond roughly with three leadership theo-
ries. Briefly, they are: (1) Personality-
Character Trait Theory, which emphasizes 
personality and character traits as the key el-
ements in leadership; (2) Institutional The-
ory, which contends that the library system, 
over time, infuses its leaders with specific 
values. The individual administrator usually 
concerns himself with human interaction 
and communication, with persons, and with 
his own contribution to the efficiency of the 
library system. In the course of time, the ad-
ministrator must conform to institutional ex-
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pectations. Library administrators. who view 
the library as a system thus differ from other 
administrators who do not; and (3) the Situa~ 
tional Theory, which holds that both the 
character of the individual administrator 
and the situation in which he finds himself 
determine, or should determine, his adminis-
trative practice. 
The prevailing research practice is to elicit 
data on a given administrative style of indi-
vidual administrators. Such data are usually 
derived by means of a questionnaire from 
such instruments as Rensis Likert's "Linking 
Pin," which tries to determine how "partici-
pative" an administrator is or Tannenbaum 
and Schmidt's "Continuum of Leadership 
Styles," which, like the "Linking Pin," mea-
sures leadership style. 
The resulting data on the administrative 
practice of a given administrator are then 
correlated with one or other administrative 
styles; if the correlation is significant, the 
conclusion generally drawn is that the ad-
ministrator's leadership style is either author-
itarian, democratic, or .laissez-faire. Cer-
tainly this apparently whimsical illustration 
may seem trite, but it contains the substance 
of most of what one encounters in most re-. 
searches in library administra.tion. 
Even on the analytic ground alone, corre-
lation would still be inappropriate in com-
parison with multivariate regression analy-
sis; in fact, regression analysis provides more 
information than correlation in that it an-
swers correlation questions, is a stronger 
method of inference, and demands less stiff 
assumptions. As Choucri and North skillfully 
observed, "Correlation is useful primarily as 
an aid to understanding regression and as an 
auxiliary tool; correlation gives no indica-
timlS concerning cause and effect; it gives 
only one number as an aid towards under-
standing a complex relationship rather than 
the estimation of a mathematical function 
yielded by regression techniques; it demands 
more restrictive assumptions, concerning the 
distribution of the data than does regression; 
and it does not tell us how two variables 
move together."11 
But empirically oriented res.earchers 
would not permit the consideration of ana-
lytic propriety to stand in their way. The im-
portant thing, they seem to contend, is to, ac-
cumulate data on administrative behavior, 
correlate these data, and show relationships 
among them. 
This practice, regrettably, has led to what 
the structural anthropologist Levi Strauss 
terms "the inductive illusion": the belief that 
reality can be discovered by t.he· accumula-
tion of more and more data and the examina-
tion of more and more cases. Empiricists per-
suade themselves to believe that if they 
gather more and more data and establish 
more and more associations, they can de-
velop theories of administration. This, to say 
the least, is a fallacy. A theory is not built by 
a mere accumulation of data. As Kenneth 
Waltz observed: 
If we gather rnore and more data and establish 
more and more a,ssociatious ... we will not finally 
find that we know somethiog. We will simply end 
up having more and more data and larger sets of 
correlations. Data never speak for themselves; ob-
servation and experience ~lever lead directly to 
knowledge of causes. i 2 
The so1,1rce of this fallacy is a failure by re-
searchers to distinguish between description 
and explanation. Statistics are descriptions in 
numerical form: if we find a strong statistical 
association between a library administrator's 
management style and a given administra-
tive instrument, it would be wrong for us to 
conclude that we have accounted for the 
management style in the sense of explaining 
it. Numbers, as Waltz notes, "may describe 
what goes on in the world"; they do not ex-
plain it. 
Statistical associations alone can never 
lead to the development of a theory. Waltz is 
right when he· contends that "a theory is not 
the occurrences seen and the associations re-
corded, but is instead the explanation of 
them."13 Even if Galileo's claim that nature 
writes its secrets in numbers is true, it is still 
necessary for men to unravel these numbers 
in the form of words. 
THEORY BUILDING 
How, then, is a theory built? How, specifi-
cally, can a theory of library administration 
be built? In a broader perspective, the ques-
tion might be put this way: How can a theory 
of administration be built? 
Earlier, we defined theory as an internally 
connected ami logically consistent proposi-
tion about the relation(s) between phenom-
ena. A theory is a product of an abstraction 
from empirical data, not a generalization 
from the data. A theory is born at the mo-
ment when a researcher abstracts from ob-
served data and tries to discern general pat-
terns that connect them. The act of 
abstracting is an active process; it involves a 
deliberate attempt to invoke flashes of new 
perception. This is not easy. Ideas do not ma-
terialize on demand; worse still, ideas often 
begin in vague, undefined forms. As Fred 
Hoyle remarks: 
It is not only difficult to come by our flashes of new 
perception, but no two of us have flashes exactly in 
the same direction. Even if you should sudden} y see 
a point in some particular problem or other . . . 
you've still got the job of convincing the rest of us. 14 
What Hoyle refers to as "the job of con-
vincing" others is the organization of the new 
flashes of ideas into a logically consistent 
form: re-creating reality from the abstrac-
tions of sense impressions. It is this organiza-
tion of ideas that Berdyaev calls "marriage" 
or a "meeting between different elements." 
The researcher brings together his personal, 
creative conception with his empirical obser-
vation to create a third thing, the offspring of 
this union: a theory. Theory creates unity 
from diversity; it imposes simplicity, order, 
and regularity on complex, disorderly, and 
apparently anomalous phenomena. 
In all circumstances, even if implicitly, 
theory, as Robin Horton reminds us, "places 
things in a causal context wider than that 
provided by common sense. "15 An illustrative 
example is Max Weber's "Protestant Ethic." 
Weber's starting point was a statistical sur-
vey, carried out in 1900 by German sociolo-
gist Max Offenbacher, into "the economic 
condition of Catholics and Protestants" in the 
religiously mixed (60 percent Catholic) 
grand duchy of Baden. Offenbacher estab-
lished that the Protestant citizens of the 
grand duchy owned a disproportionately 
large percentage of capital assets and had 
more than their fair share of leading posi-
tions, educational qualifications, academic 
positions, and skilled labor jobs.l6 Weber 
went beyond a mere description of Offen-
bacher's data and abstracted from it by ask-
ing himself to what combination of circum-
stances the following fact should be attrib-
uted: "Business leaders and owners of 
capital, as well as the higher grades of skilled 
Creative Research I 315 
labor, and even more the higher technically 
and commercially trained personnel of mod-
ern enterprises, are overwhelmingly Protes-
tant."17 He postulated that the answer to his 
rhetorical question must be located in the 
doctrinal foundation of Calvinistic Protes-
tantism (Protestant Ethic). 
Formal logic is based on this process. Prin-
ciples of logic presume that putting together 
known truths in specially formulated ways 
yields new truths. This is the basis of Aristo-
telian syllogism, which, in its simplest form, 
is generally stated thus: 
Every man dies 
Socrates is a man 
Therefore Socrates will die. 
In this way, a person may move reasonably 
from the known to the unknown by organiz-
ing empirical data in a certain manner and 
then, on the basis of these data, deducing a 
generalization. 
The major distinction between formal 
logic and creative abstracting lies in how the 
combination process goes. Formal logic vir-
tually predetermines its conclusions by dis-
tinctive patterns of movement. Creative ab-
stracting, on the other hand, is much less 
rigid and, therefore, much less certain in its 
conclusion- but generally more open to dis-
covery. A person takes a certain amount of 
risk in combining ideas. He will be uncertain 
how fruitful the synthesis will be, yet the 
chances are high that some fruitful abstract-
ing will ensue. It is this critical abstracting 
that students of Marxism refer to as dialec-
tics. Dialectical analysis, in the context of ad-
ministration, begins with a given adminis-
trative style as it is observed (thesis), 
examines its opposite or negation (antithesis) , 
and postulates, by a logical examination of 
all available information, the development 
of a new approach that will overcome the de-
fects of the existing administrative style (syn-
thesis). 
Most researchers in library administration 
do not go beyond the stage of antithesis orne-
gation. Negation itself is viewed by students 
of dialectical orientation merely as a step to-
wards a radical rejection of the status quo. It 
is not the analytic conclusion, for it yields 
nothing other than the rejection of an exist-
ing system. Negation, considered as an ana-
lytic end, is a fruitless effort, for actions do 
not lie in the act of negation, but in proposi-
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tions that lead to overcoming an observed de-
fect. A social change activist who rejects (or 
negates) all existing systems is not contribut-
ing to social progress unless and until he, by a 
conscious act of will, proposes an alternative 
path to change that is born out of a careful 
analysis of both the existing order and its al-
ternatives. It is this critical, analytic synthe-
sis that gives birth to fruitful abstracting. 
Creative abstraction is not easy nor is it 
very common. As Carl Rogers observes: 
In the sciences, there is an ample supply of techni-
cians, but the number who can creatively formu-
late fruitful hypotheses and theories is small 
indeed. 18 
Creative abstracting takes a considerable 
amount of personal conviction and commit-
ment. This, contrary to what human empiri-
cists would like us to believe, applies to both 
the natural and the social sciences. In his 
book, Personal Knowledge, Michael Polanyi 
makes it clear that even scientific knowledge 
is personal knowledge, committed knowl-
edge. It is erroneous to believe that scientific 
knowledge is impersonal and "out there," 
that it has nothing to do with the belief of the 
individual who has discovered it. Instead, 
every aspect of science is pervaded by disci-
plined personal commitment, and Polanyi 
makes the case very persuasively that the 
whole attempt to divorce science from the 
person is a completely unrealistic one. Per-
haps a brief quotation will provide the flavor 
of his thinking: 
So we see that both Kepler and Einstein ap-
proached nature with intellectual passions and 
with beliefs inherent in these passions, which led 
them to their triumphs and misguided them to 
their errors. These passions and beliefs were theirs, 
personally, even though they held them in the con-
viction that they were valid, universally .19 
It is evident that reality cannot be discov-
ered by merely accumulating empirical data 
on human behavior. In the particular case of 
library administration, aggregation of em-
pirical cases of administrative styles and 
practices cannot advance the understanding 
of library administration, nor can it lead to 
the development of a viable theory of admin-
istration. To develop a viable theory of ad-
ministration, the researcher must go beyond 
the empirical data before him: he must com-
bine what is already known in the field with 
his perception of the problem before him to 
develop a new and unique way of viewing 
the problem. A descriptive account of ob-
servable administrative behavior is only a 
beginning- an explanation must be sought 
as to why the individual chooses that specific 
style of administration, what environmental 
and other conditions facilitate or hinder the 
choice, and how that choice relates to the in-
dividual's social, economic, political, and 
cultural predispositions. The objective is the 
development of a theory or theories of ad-
nJinistration that furnish us with what type 
of person tends to practice what style of ad-
ministration under what type of social, eco-
nomic, political, and cultural circumstances. 
It would then be possible to realize how so-
cial, economic, trait, political, and cultural 
factors influence or determine administra-
tive practices. 
The goal would be to arrive at a nomologi-
cal universal generalization about adminis-
trative styles and practices and factors that 
influence them. We would then be in a posi-
tion to say: "Given the following factors, put 
this person in this institution, organization, 
or agency." 
It is important here to elaborate a bit on 
the nature of nomological generalizations. 
Generalizations may be conveniently 
grouped into three major categories: nomo-
logical universal, prevalence, and probabi-
listic.20 We will use, for example, the state-
ment, "Experienced librarians ·who also 
worked as social workers make good library 
administrators at the village level." The 
three types can be expressed as follows: a 
nomological universal generalization (all ex-
perienced librarians who also worked as so-
cial workers make good library administra-
tors at the village level); a prevalence 
generalization (generally or normally experi-
enced librarians who also worked as social 
workers make good library administrators at 
the village level); and a probabilistic general-
ization (the probability that an experienced 
librarian who also worked as a social worker 
will make a good library administrator at the 
village level is 90 percent). 
From the above examples it is evident that 
a nomological universal generalization is a 
proposition that refers to an indefinite num-
ber of instances. Such universal generaliza-
tions cover every case. A nomological univer-
sal generalization is very difficult to attain, 
but it must constitute the goal of research be-
cause, as Phillips has noted, "It is [only] the 
nomological type [of generalization] which 
has the necessary validity for prediction and 
control. "21 Both the prevalence and probabi-
listic generalizations contain elements of un-
certainty. As an objective (short-term mea-
sure), both may be adequate, but, in the long 
run, the goal of all research must be the at-
tainment of nomological universal general-
izations. 
How can nomological universal general-
izations be attained? Different people tend to 
behave differently in identical situations. 
How can we validly arrive at a universal gen-
eralization that refers to an indefinite num-
ber of instances? The key lies, in this author's 
view, in two factors: data gathering and the 
meanings we assign to terms. 
DATA GATHERING 
To validly arrive at nomological universal 
generalizations, research data must be all-
embracing. This means that data must be de-
rived from a large variety of sources-
sources that have even the remotest 
theoretical probability of affecting the sub-
ject under study. In the specific case of li-
brary administration, data must be derived 
from all possible factors that can affect a 
given administrator's behavior. Data sources 
must include, as a minimum, the administra-
tor's socioeconomic status, political orienta-
tion, health condition, age, educational 
level, and cultural memory. 
The approach must, as we have seen, be 
dialectical- using dialectics in Sherman's 
sense to denote "an approach to problems 
that visualizes the world as an intercon-
nected totality. "22 It is not enough to have an 
administrator simply fill in a questionnaire 
and to draw a conclusion from a descriptive 
analysis of his responses. Research findings in 
this case must always be probabilistic at best 
since the administrator's behavior is merely 
described, not explained. 
Here is where positivism may be wrong, 
since a large part of what influences behavior 
may be, and generally is, practically unob-
servable. Observable behavior is generally a 
function of two factors: stimulus and atti-
tude. Stimulus gives rise to attitude; observ-
able behavior is a manifestation of attitude. 
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By relying entirely on observable behavior as 
the ultimate source of reality, positivists or 
"human empiricists" tend to approach real-
ity from a superficial standpoint. They forget 
that every behavior has a meaning for the be-
haver and that no satisfactory explanation of 
a behavior can be arrived at unless we take 
into consideration the motivations and inten-
tions of the behaver. Besides, any single be-
havior may have been motivated by an im-
mense number of unobservable factors. As 
Lakatos observed, "Any explanation [based 
on observed behavior] is only approximate, 
because of the infinite complexity of the fac-
tors involved in determining any single 
event."23 
MEANING IN LANGUAGE 
All words have both assigned meaning, 
sometimes called connotation, and specific 
area of application, sometimes called deno-
tation. Phillips24 has shown that most state-
ments usually labeled "factual" by research-
ers are actually characterized by multiple 
meanings, some factual, some valuative. His 
illustrative example is a statement such as, 
"Democracy is a better form of government 
than communism." Phillips has shown that 
this deceptively simple statement may mean 
any of four things: (1) an approval of democ-
racy by the speaker; (2) an attempt by the 
speaker to persuade his listeners to change 
their attitudes in favor of democracy and 
against communism; (3) a belief by the 
speaker in the factual accuracy of his state-
ment and his right to persuade others to ac-
cept it; and (4) the speaker's willingness to lis-
ten to counterarguments with a belief that he 
can withstand them. 
It is inconceivable that we can achieve 
nomological universal generalizations in re-
search unless we use words so precisely that 
the meanings we assign to them are clear and 
unambiguous. It would be much more help-
ful if the maker of the statement "Democracy 
is a better form of government than commu-
nism" defined not only what he meant by 
"good" government, but also the kind of be-
havior he considers democratic, under what 
circumstances such characteristics should be 
regarded as good, and under what circum-
stances they cease to be termed good. For ex-
ample, two individuals may seem to agree on 
the field of its application (denotation). They 
318 I College & Research Libraries • july 1982 
may agree that whatever increases the happi-
ness of a given social unit is good, but one of 
them may disagree that a victorious war of 
conquest qualifies as "good." When research-
ers talk about "participative management," 
the term almost invariably means different 
things to different people. Does a library ad-
ministrator who consults his staff in all cases 
of policy, but who nevertheless issues instruc-
tions that reflect his private, personal deci-
sion, practice participative management? 
Does a library administrator who does not 
consult with his staff in a formal way, but 
whose decisions invariably reflect the inter-
est of the staff, fail to practice participative 
management? What specifically is "partici-
pative management?" 
If we accept, as the fundamental purpose 
of research in administration, the discovery 
of basic invariants, structures or laws (given 
specified conditions) that can serve as a prop-
osition that will take a deductive form, and 
from which we can derive counterfactual 
claims about the relations of individual 
traits, unique situation or environment, in-
stitutional variables, and administrative 
style, then the language we use in research 
reports must be so precise that the probabil-
ity of both connotative and denotative ambi-
guity, if not completely eliminated, is re-
duced to an absolute minimum. 
CoNCLUSION 
The insistence by researchers on strict ob-
servance of the law of evidence is legitimate 
and indisputable. What is and has been dis-
putable is what constitutes evidence. Human 
empiricists contend that only the practical 
and observable can legitimately be entitled 
to a claim of legitimacy. Others are not so 
sure. They argue that empiricism tends to 
lead to quantitative bias as well as reduction-
ism, which emphasizes a theoretical frame-
work of hypothesis over total experience. Be-
sides, quantitative bias tends to mistake 
description for explanation. The aim of re-
search is to provide explanation of the rela-
tionship between phenomena in nature. 
When research is purely descriptive or when 
it takes the form of a typology of a given phe-
nomenon, the description or typology is only 
an aid to eventual explanation and under-
standing of the phenomenon under study. 
Empirical research in library administra-
tion, particularly as it is reported in Disserta-
tion Abstracts International, is becoming 
something of a ritual. It is typified by the use 
of essentially the same pattern of instrument 
to determine the administrative style of a va-
riety of library administrators. The conclu-
sions give the impression of a litany, sound-
ing essentially the echo of studies done 
several years ago and contributing nothing in 
the way of theory building. 
This paper is an appeal for creativity in li-
brary research. "Not that again," as the 
writer and cognitive theorist Jerome Bruner 
observed, "is a sign of dismay." 
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